Yazda Report on Humanitarian Aid and Development Opportunities in Sinjar: Caring for IDPs While Rebuilding and Facilitating Returns

Assessment Data Updated: Dec. 20, 2015

1. Introduction
2. Understanding the Political Situation
3. Detailed Assessment by Location
4. Key Issues and Recommendations
5. Contacts

Section 1: Introduction

Sinjar: a Region, a Mountain, and a City

Speaking about Sinjar can be confusing. The mountain is called “Sinjar” (“Shingal” in Kurdish), as is the city of Sinjar which is located on the south side of the mountain. Further, the entire area is commonly referred to as “Sinjar.” For example, a Yazidi from a collective village on the north side of the mountain will usually say “I am from Sinjar” rather than specifying the name of the village. (Collective villages were formed in 1975 when Saddam relocated Yazidis from their traditional villages by force, moving them into “collectives” and often destroying their home villages, for reasons of strategic control.) This report uses “Sinjar” to refer to the region, and anytime the mountain or the city are referred to, they will be specified as such.

Rebuilding and Relief Are Related

This report contains Yazda’s detailed need assessment for almost all areas on the north side of Sinjar Mountain where IDPs have taken residence or where displaced Yazidis have begun to return. Most of these areas have been overlooked by NGOs providing humanitarian aid and relief to Sinjar because they are hidden from view. IDPs in many of these areas have complained to Yazda that most aid is delivered to IDP populations that are clustered together on top of the mountain and clearly visible from the road, and some mentioned considering moving up to the top of the mountain, despite the harsher conditions of cold, in hopes that they would receive more aid.

One objective of this report is to alert NGOs of the significant population of IDPs that have taken up residence in lesser-known areas on the north side of the mountain.

Yazda also believes that it is imperative to begin rebuilding the Sinjar region so that IDPs in the camps of Dohuk can begin returning home. This is achievable, especially if NGOs work together and coordinate
reconstruction efforts. Not only will this help alleviate the IDP crisis that afflicts Dohuk and the KRG economically, but it will significantly improve the support system currently sustaining the IDP populations already struggling in Sinjar.

Most communities on the north side of Mount Sinjar were inhabited by Yazidi farmers; helping these populations to return and restart their farms should be a major priority. As this report shows, many farmers have already returned and have begun planting, and importantly, these communities are already supporting many IDP populations that have received no aid from NGOs or governments. Therefore, promoting the development of farms on the north side of Sinjar directly impacts the support for the IDP populations from the mountain’s south side who have taken shelter among the communities on the north side who are sustaining them.

The ultimate goal of all organizations should be restoring the Yazidi community to its homeland, and therefore, it is important to shift from thinking exclusively in terms of aid and relief to thinking and planning for rebuilding and facilitating returns.

Section 2: Understanding the Political Situation

It is essential that any NGO planning to conduct work in Sinjar have a firm understanding of the political realities currently affecting the area. That means it is necessary to discuss sensitive issues that are relevant for any organization working in the area.

Political Competition Hinders the Resolution of the Sinjar Crisis

Sinjar is currently the center of a five-way political competition between the PDK, PUK, PKK, Baghdad, and independent Yazidi actors. The most important factor affecting Sinjar now is the competition between the PDK (“Kurdistan Democratic Party”—English acronym is “KDP”) and the PKK (and the PKK affiliates). This competition has an unhealthy effect on the Sinjar population—particularly the displaced Yazidi community—for three reasons: 1) the lack of cooperation between the parties and their militias delays the military victory over IS (Islamic State) and therefore slows the return of security to the area (most Yazidi areas south of the mountain remain under IS control even after the liberation of the city of Sinjar); 2) it slows the return of vital services to the Sinjar region; and 3) it impedes the work of NGOs, the delivery of aid, and the rebuilding process.

The origin of the PKK presence in Sinjar lies in the events of the first week of August, 2014. On Aug. 3, 2014, the day that IS jihadists attacked Yazidi communities in Sinjar and began enslaving Yazidi women and girls, the Peshmerga pulled out ahead of the advance without engaging IS forces. Left without protection, tens of thousands of Yazidis trekked up Sinjar Mountain from the towns below, to take refuge. The PKK role in Sinjar began days later, when the YPG (the Syrian PKK affiliate) crossed the Syrian border into Iraq, broke through IS lines, and established a corridor to evacuate the trapped Yazidis off of the mountain. This military action also allowed PKK forces to enter Sinjar Mountain, where they have maintained the front line against IS up to the present. Through these events, the PKK presence has become thoroughly entrenched in Sinjar where they have established numerous permanent bases.
Until December of 2014 when the PDK Peshmerga regained control of the north side of Sinjar, the YPG/PKK (and the YBŞ, their newly-created Yazidi affiliate) were the only major force defending Sinjar, and until the liberation of the city of Sinjar in November of 2015, the PKK were the primary force defending the front line at Sinjar City, which prevented IS from ascending the mountain and taking control of it. NGOs must therefore be cognizant of the fact that the majority of Yazidis in Sinjar now maintain sympathetic attitudes toward the PKK and its affiliates, while trust with the PDK (and therefore the KRG itself) is at an all-time low. Aid work done in “coordination” with the government is therefore not likely to be seen as neutral to local Yazidis, but will rather be seen as politicized. This must be approached with caution.

This newly-established presence and role of the PKK in Sinjar has meant a loss of PDK political influence in Sinjar. The result is a lack of enthusiasm to spearhead aid and development projects, which they fear might inadvertently benefit the PKK. Also evident is the absence of any serious effort to promote rebuilding and the return of Yazidi populations to the area. Further, Yazidis suspected of cooperation with the PKK are being persecuted (with those joining the YBŞ facing arrest), and the free movement of goods and equipment to Sinjar is impeded. Some NGOs have also experienced difficulty gaining access for their work in Sinjar. The return of services is also moving at a much slower rate than necessary.

The losers in this scenario are the Yazidi people, who have been delayed in returning to their homeland due to a political competition. Ideally, all parties should cooperate together to rebuild Sinjar and see the Yazidis returned to their home communities. Unfortunately, the PDK does not have incentive in promoting the return of Yazidis, as an increase in the Sinjar population could possibly mean more support for the PKK. This can explain the lack of motivation for liberating the Yazidi areas south of the mountain, most of which remain under IS control today.

Due to this context, Yazda has observed the unfortunate reality that higher numbers of Yazidis are emigrating from Iraq now than before the liberation of the city of Sinjar in Nov. 2015. Many families waited a year and a half for the south side of the mountain to be liberated, but after the liberation of the city, none of the habitable Yazidi areas were liberated, and many have decided that waiting any longer is futile. Most have set their sights on relocation to Germany or other countries, further exacerbating Europe’s immigration crisis. Many Yazidis have given up hope that they have a viable future in Iraq, and without focused, large-scale efforts to rebuild and promote the return of Yazidi people to their Sinjar homeland, this minority will continue to decline in the country.

Yazidis in the majority of the areas where we conducted our survey complained that humanitarian aid is being distributed in a politicized manner. Most report that families aligned with the PDK are receiving better aid from the local government (nahiya) and many reported being denied aid if officials suspected them of having relationships with the PKK. Yazidis we spoke with repeatedly requested that aid be delivered to communities directly by NGOs, not through the government or any local officials, including those of the nahiya. People also emphasized the request that aid be distributed equally according to holders of bataqa cards (which each family has—see “distributions” under section 4 of this report) and that every family in a given area receive aid, regardless of political affiliation. NGOs working in Sinjar should understand the fears that beset Yazidis currently and should approach these issues carefully.
Understanding the Players

The PDK: The PDK party flag is flown in many locations. The PDK also has “local committees” which generally have an office in each town. These offices serve as a gathering place for party officials who are generally involved in local affairs.

The PUK: Kurdistan’s other major party, the PUK, has only minimal influence in Sinjar, but their offices are active and their flags are flown in some locations. They keep some Peshmerga in the area.

Peshmerga are never neutral but are always party-affiliated. Most Peshmerga in Sinjar are PDK affiliated. Peshmerga aligned with the PDK or PUK usually fly the Kurdistan flag.

The Peshmerga Rojava: These are a force of Syrian Kurdish fighters aligned with the PDK. The PDK has a presence in Syria and created this brand of Peshmerga for those Syrian fighters. They are active inside Iraq as well, and will be seen patrolling the area between Rabî’ and Sinjar. They wear the insignia show to the left.

The official flag of the entire PKK organization (not a specifically military flag, though often flown at bases for PKK troops).

Like the PDK’s Local Committees, the PKK also runs local party offices. “Tevda” is the PKK entity that is officially registered in Iraq as a political party. (i.e., Tevda = PKK in Iraq) Their offices are located on Sinjar Mountain and in communities in the Sinjar region.

The HPG flag: “HPG” = “Hêzên Parastina Gel,” “People’s Defense Forces.” This is the official military forces of the PKK. While the flag above is the party flag (which is political rather than military), this is the official flag for militarized PKK forces. Though the YPG was the first fighter group to attack IS and create a lifeline between Syria and Sinjar after the Peshmerga withdrew on Aug. 3, most YPG fighters who stayed inside Sinjar later rebranded as “HPG.” That is because technically, YPG is supposed to be exclusively the Syrian affiliate, so all PKK-affiliated forces inside Iraq proper (except for special Yazidi militias), took on the official HPG name. (Many of those were originally
PKK anyway, and not specifically YPG, because after the YPG conducted their initial operation, many PKK fighters came from across the Kurdish world to join the front line in Sinjar, and many of them were not part of the YPG). The YPG did return to Iraq (as “YPG”) during the November offensive. One YPG base remains in Dohola.

The YJA STAR “Yekîneyên Jinên Azad ên Star,” the female equivalent of the HPG (i.e. the female PKK fighters).

YPG: YPG flag, militarized forces of the Kurdish “PYD” party, the Syrian PKK affiliate.

Flag of the YPJ, the female counterpart of the YPG. As with the YPG, these are designated for Syria, but they were active in Sinjar and the flag is still flown in some places.

The YBŞ: “Yekîneyên Berxwedana Şengalê,” “Sinjar Resistance Units,” a Yazidi militia affiliated with and supported by the PKK. The PKK created this militia to enable the Yazidis to self-protect in Sinjar, and it also serves as a mechanism for the PKK to spread its particular political ideology among the Yazidis. This is the most powerful Yazidi militia. The YJÊ, which are the female forces of this militia (“Yekinêyen Jinên Êzidxan” “Êzidxan Women's Units”) use this same flag and have not yet created a separate flag. Yazidis who join these militias are subject to harassment and arrest by KRG security forces if they attempt to enter Dohuk.

The flag of Rojava, Syrian Kurdistan (or “West Kurdistan”). Some in the area support Sinjar becoming a governorate within Iraqi Kurdistan; others want it to be a governorate within Iraq and not part of the Kurdistan Region; others support Sinjar being absorbed into Rojava rather than remaining part of Iraq—those with such sentiments may fly this flag.

The flag of the “Marxist-Leninist Communist Party,” a Kurdish party based in Turkey that sent fighters to fight IS in Sinjar.

HPE: “Hêza Parastina Ezidkhane” (this is a recently-adopted name; the militia was previously the “HPŞ – Hêza Parastina Şingal,” or “Sinjar Defense Forces”) This is a Yazidi militia created by Haider Shesho. Haider belongs to the PUK, but this militia claims to be independent and does not fly PUK flags. Like the YBŞ, this militia was created in an attempt to enable Yazidis to self-protect in the absence of security and defenses in
Sinjar. Unlike the YBŞ, which is a PKK affiliate and therefore has major backing, the HPE has no significant sponsor, and therefore its role has been less relevant on the ground than that of the YBŞ.

The insignia of the HPŞ.

This is the party flag of the “Yazidi Movement for Reform and Progress,” an independent Yazidi party that holds one seat in Baghdad.

The Iraqi flag is flown by some in Sinjar who are influenced by Baghdad.
Section 3: Detailed Assessment by Location

The Geography of the Survey

The rudimentary map below shows Sinjar (with major roads in black) divided into five relevant areas (in red). These five zones consist of areas on top of Sinjar Mountain and on its northern side. These areas are relevant because they currently contain populations of IDPs, returnees, or both. The south side of the mountain is not yet secure enough for families to return to it. (Further, except for the city of Sinjar itself, which is almost entirely destroyed, most Yazidi areas in the south remain under IS control.)

Zone 5 is not included in this survey as it contains the primary population of visible IDPs and is already receiving attention from NGOs. (It should be mentioned that Zone 5 does need more assistance and aid, of various forms, and it should not be assumed that its needs are met, despite its visibility.) Tom Robinson of the Rise Foundation recently (Nov.) conducted a survey of needs for this area, and we recommend consulting their report, entitled “Sinjar Mountain Needs Overview.”

The four zones covered in Yazda’s assessment are as follows:

Zone 1: All Yazidi areas west of Snune and the gateway to the mountain, namely Khanasor to Bara, all settlements along the foot of the mountain, and the farmlands between the road and the mountain.

Zone 2: The corridor running along the main road to Snune and the mountain, and adjacent settlements.

Zone 3: Communities east of Snune and north of the road, including all Yazidi collective villages (except Khanasor and Snune) and adjacent inhabited areas.

Zone 4: All inhabited areas east of Snune lying between the road and the mountain.

Totals for all zones are given at the end of section 3.
Emphases and Methodology of this Assessment

This assessment does not follow a particular standardized format for conducting need assessments, but rather reflects information gathered at each location that was considered important by the local people. Areas of focus of this survey include:

- Scope of destruction to homes and infrastructure within given locations
- An attempt to gain a sense of change in population after the crisis began
- Differentiating between returnees and IDPs among the population of a location
- Understanding local livelihoods and learning what kinds of support are needed for people to rebuild their lives; understanding the separate needs of IDPs; understanding how the two are related
- Understanding how to help families restart farming (for a sense of farming needs that can be applied in many locations, focus on these three entries: #2 – Bahrava; #6 – Qaserke; and #31 – Adiqa)
- Services needed to enable people to return (usually electricity, water, health, and education)
- Learning about any special issues that may exist

Though we do mention points related to health care when relevant, this assessment did not emphasize health care in detail. Medair recently (Nov.) performed some helpful assessments regarding health services and medicine that we recommend consulting. (Note that their survey used the Arabized names for the Yazidi collective villages rather than the Kurdish names, which may create confusion.)

Zone 1

1 – Bara

IS destroyed 13 houses in Bara and burned others. No families have moved back yet, as Bara was the front line until recently.
2 – Bahrava
Bahrava is a region south of the main road consisting of outspread farms.

Current Population: Total families as of Dec. 10, 2015: 14, of these 11 are returnees and 3 are IDP families who in part depend on support from the returnees. The returnees are working to restart their farms, but face several challenges.

Enabling returns through rebuilding: Many lost their homes here, burned or blown up by IS, which is the main factor preventing returns. There were 60 homes in Bahrava before IS came. Of these, 48 were cement ones; of the cement homes, IS demolished 45 (through bulldozing or blowing them up with explosives). The other homes of Bahrava were mud houses that are common in Sinjar. These houses are made with a mud/straw mixture which will burn. IS burned most of these, but some of them only experience partial damage with a few rooms remaining habitable. The 14 families that have gone back are those with mud houses inside which there remains at least a small livable space. We learned that many more families desire and are ready to return to Bahrava from the camps, but the problem is that their homes were destroyed. Tents aren’t good in this area because of the cold and high winds. Most families will not come back to this area if they only have tents to live in, but new mud houses would allow families to return. Mud houses would serve as temporary homes until families are able to rebuild their cement ones themselves. But the mud houses cannot be rebuilt until warmer weather returns—the mud/straw mixture cannot be made in the extreme cold weather. An alternative would be providing families with “caravans” (plastic structures often used in camps) to live in temporarily.

Homes demolished by IS in Bahrava

Rebuilding livelihoods: All families were farmers; many were agriculturalists in addition to being pastoralists. These are ready now to start their farms; they have much of what they need but need help getting some equipment and seeds. Primary needs:
1) Diesel and seeds are the biggest needs for farmers here.
2) Seeds: Now (December) is the time to plant grains, onions, and fava beans (bakala). Onions are grown two ways: either with seeds or with bulbs. They only want to use the bulbs. It costs 700 IQD per kilo for onion bulbs. Each family needs an average of 250 kilos, so approximately 175,000 IQD per family.
2) Their water pumps for their wells and the generators they need to power those wells were stolen. The price for a well pump (including needed accessories) is 700,000 to 800,000 IQD.
3) Around 7 or 8 wells (not counted by us) were also destroyed by IS here. A new well costs 1,200,000 IQD for the digging; 400,000 IQD to put in the pipe. Each well only served a single family’s farm; there were no communal wells.
4) Irrigation pipes (small above-ground pipes with holes for watering crops) are needed. They cost 50,000 IQD per roll; each farmer needs an average of 10 rolls.

5) Fertilizer: 2 kinds are needed: nitrogen and phosphorus blends. Per ton, these are 700,000 to 750,000 IQD and 900,000 IQD, respectively. The cost will vary by amount of land, but 300,000 IQD should be considered the bare minimum for a small family farm growing onions, tomatoes, cucumbers, etc.

6) Grains: Farms growing grains will require one ton of wheat and 1.5 tons of barley to plant, per farm. This runs around 1,000,000 IQD. Only the nitrogen fertilizer is used for the grains; each farm growing grain will need one ton. Farmers in Bahrava were told in November by the Snune Agriculture Office (Nineveh government agriculture department) that they would be given grain, but this hasn’t happened. There is a surplus of Arab-owned grain in Rabī’a, so it is unclear why this has not happened.

7) Pesticide is needed: this is less expensive, around 100,000 IQD per farm.

8) Bahrava still has no grid power, which means farmers must use generators to run irrigation pumps. The lack of services (electricity, water, education), in addition to the destruction to homes, is the main reason preventing people from returning now.

Other needs: Families that have moved back more recently haven’t received any kerosene. All families are in need of support for fuel and food. Kerosene is essential for powering heaters to help families survive the winter cold. Government officials made copies of their bataqa cards and said that each bataqa holder is entitled to 100 liters of kerosene. This is only about half as much as what is needed for a family per month, and it is not reaching the families regularly. They are also being charged a fee when being given their kerosene.

Medicine: Medical services were not mentioned as a need by anyone in Bahrava, because they can access nearby medical stations in Khanasor and Snune. (Later we heard complaints that Khanasor’s health center does not yet contain a lab.)

Jifriye is a tiny village hosting an important holy place, the temple of Sheikh Shams, at the foot of Sinjar mountain just south of Bahrava. Jifriya is one of the only two locations on the north side of the mountain west of the gateway to the mountain that were not taken by IS; Yazidis stayed and defended this temple and because of its position on higher ground they were able to successfully defend it from August to December with only a few men.

Current population: 8 families are now living in Jifriye, all of whom are returnees. They receive no external support from any organization. In early December, the Snune Nahiya gave 100 liters of kerosene to only two of the families. They also received some donated clothes from them.

Top needs: kerosene, food (all kinds—they currently have rice/beans), cooking oil, flour
**Water:** They have a 175-meter well, but it is not enough to supply the village and it might not pass quality tests for human consumption, but people are drinking from it anyway. They need a 300-meter well. “If we had water here, more families would come back,” one man said. This 300-meter well never existed—when he says “come back,” he means coming back to rebuild following the era of Saddam’s depopulation program. (This was one of the villages from which Saddam forcibly relocated the people.)

**Village infrastructure:**
1) The village needs a new road. The road is 7 km long. The Nineveh government had contracted an Arab man to pave the road for 1 billion IQD; work had just started when IS came. “Ato,” a Yazidi engineer was in charge of this project but he is now in Germany. We can approach the Nineveh Provincial Council again to try to restart this.
2) The village needs electricity. It has never had electricity and there are no power lines from Khanasor. They have submitted many proposals for electricity to the nahiya and to the awqaf (to the latter because the village is a temple site) and to the Nineveh Provincial Council, but after IS came, this effort ceased. Power lines can be run from the adjacent village of Karke, located just NW of Jifriya, but it would be better to run the lines directly south from Bahrava, because the land between Bahrava and Jifriya is owned by the people of Jifriya, whereas Karke’s land is owned by the Smoqi tribe.

**4 – Karke**
Karke was a village that Saddam depopulated, but many mud structures remain. Some other houses existed before IS, as well, and people were living there. IS took this town and demolished 1 house, burned others, and planted IEDs.

**Current Population:** 4 families are living in Karke now, **all are IDPs.** They are living in houses there, not tents. These families are all very poor. They are tending sheep in Karke. None of Karke’s original inhabitants have returned yet.

**Needs:** Fuel (diesel for water pumps and kerosene for heaters), food (they only have bourghul, oil, and rice currently).

**Water:** Karke has a well and it is producing enough water for present needs.
5 – Hamiska (one home) and Kora Smoqa (three homes)
Just SW of Karke is Hamiska. It only had one family before IS came, and no one is living there now. Kora Smoqa is another village depopulated (and destroyed) by Saddam. People in some of the collective villages are from these old villages and would return to live there if they could be rebuilt.

Kora Smoqa, depopulated in Saddam’s time and awaiting rebuilding

6 – Qaserke
Qaserke is a village just off the main road west of Khanasor (south side of the road). It had nearly 50 families before IS came, all of whom were farmers. At least 28 houses were blown up by IS here.

Current population: 19 families have returned to Qaserke.

Rebuilding: “We started coming back Dec. 22, 2014, rotating different families. Our houses have been burned by IS and no one has come and asked us what we need in order to return.” More families than these have tried to return, but are not able to come back because their houses were burned. If caravans were provided for the people, at least 20 more families are ready to return. They can live in the caravans while rebuilding their homes and their lives here. Mud houses cannot be built in this cold weather. Caravans are one options, and cinderblock structures are another option. These require 2,000 blocks. It costs 700,000 IQD for 1,000 blocks. Also needed for cinderblock homes are gravel, sand, rebar, plus sheet metal for the roofs. It may cost approximately 14,000,000 IQD for one cinderblock home. There are many homes that IS burned that experienced only partial damage, which could be repaired to allow people to return.
**Farming:** Crops grown in this area include: Radishes, cucumbers, tomatoes, corn, fava beans, okra, garlic, onions. Potatoes require more water and they don’t have enough. Seeds for winter cucumbers are different from those used in the summer, and are more expensive. Each family needs $200 for winter seeds (vs. 150,000 IQD for summer seeds). (Three brothers also own 7 greenhouses here and these need 100,000 IQD each for tomato seeds. Seeds for tomatoes and cucumbers are the most important for them. They’ve got beans/okra/corn/onions covered already. They use a different kind of fertilizer for the greenhouses, called “Singral.” Each greenhouse consumes 6 bags per year, and each bag is 70,000 IQD. It is purchased in Dohuk.) Everything grown outside of the greenhouses (such as radishes) requires a fertilizer blend, “murakab.” They need 1 ton of this per family, per year, which amounts to 900,000 to 1,000,000 IQD. All families use this kind. (Those with the greenhouses would like special heaters to warm the greenhouses. These cost $2,000 each and need 2 for each greenhouse, plus generators to run them. A large generator [costing around $10,000] could operate heaters for all 7 greenhouses. Building a new greenhouse costs $2,500. IS damaged the plastic they use to cover their greenhouses, but they have repaired them.)
**Water:** No grid power has been restored and without it they cannot power their pumps. They have enough wells in this area, but without grid power, it is expensive to constantly run generators to operate the pumps. Power lines run from Khanasor to this village. In the absence of power, they need 600 liters of diesel per family per month, to pump enough water for irrigation. They need more irrigation pipes (the watering ones with holes). These cost 60,000 IQD for 400 meters; each family needs 6 of these.

**Kerosene:** The government gave kerosene only once to the families here, and it was not nearly enough. They have never been given diesel.

**Medicine:** Covered by Khanasor/Snune.

**Education:** Qaserke has an operational school with 5 teachers. They need 3 or 4 toilets for it. The pupils also need uniforms which are made in Dohuk, the grey and white ones. These might cost around 25,000 IQD each. They want a laptop for a teacher. They currently have 32 pupils from age 6 to age 14. They have received some school supplies from the UN and from the Barzani Foundation. The school needs a caravan for teachers to sleep in because the teachers come from elsewhere (not Qaserke) and they don’t have transportation to and from the village. They need to be able to stay there and another option doesn’t currently exist.
7 – Haliqe
Like Jifriye, Haliqe is also home to a sacred temple, and is the second site west of the gateway to the mountain that was not conquered by IS. 30 families total are living there now, of which 29 are IDPs. Agriculture is not possible here because of the rocky ground, but chickens would be good. They need food, fuel, winter clothing, winterization materials for their tents, and any available non-food items.

8 – Karaj Sheva Rash
About 20 families lived here before IS came. All houses were destroyed or burned by IS, except for two. The burned houses underwent partial or complete damage. Many families want to return, if there is support for them. 3 families have returned, and are living together in the same house.

8 – Karaj Sheva Rash
About 20 families lived here before IS came. All houses were destroyed or burned by IS, except for two. The burned houses underwent partial or complete damage. Many families want to return, if there is support for them. 3 families have returned, and are living together in the same house.

Fuel: They need kerosene and have received none from the government. They need at least 200 liters per month per family.

Farming: They farm onions, fava beans (Kurdish bakala, Arabic fuul), tomatoes, cucumbers, carrots, and radishes. They have already planted carrots, radishes, and fava beans. They need diesel for their irrigation pumps. They will need support toward the end of January to plant tomatoes, okra, eggplant, and cucumbers. For these four crops combined, each family will need a total of $200 for all seeds. Each family will need nylon ground cover to protect the ground from cold, 30 meters per family, costing approximately 90,000 IQD (for 30 meters). They already have chickens and sheep.

9 – Khanasor (collective village)
The largest of all the Yazidi collective villages. The PKK is the dominant authority here, and they coordinate/provide local aid and services. Reportedly, NGOs have not brought much aid to Khanasor.
**Current population:** Over 55 families are living in Khanasor as of Dec. 17, and this number is increasing daily. The number of these which are IDPs is unknown. We do not have data on the number of destroyed homes in Khanasor, but it seems that it was less than the nearby communities in the countryside (the other areas described as “Zone 1”).

**Medical:** A health center exists but it lacks a lab. They need better equipment and specialized doctors.

**Electricity/Water:** Grid power has not been restored, despite it having been restored in nearby Snune and some other collective villages. Local people believe that this is political, because Khanasor has a primary PKK presence. The PKK is providing electricity to most of the families in the town via large generators, but if the number of returnees continues to grow, the need will exceed the capacity. Khanasor had water problems even before Aug. 3, as part of the city had no public water system.

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**Zone 2**

**10 - Trebka**

Trebka is the first Yazidi community that one will encounter when entering the Sinjar region from Rabi’a. It is located 8 km north of Snune on the east side of the main road.

**Current population:** Before Aug. 3, 2014, 80 families lived here. 3 families have now returned and 3 more are living here as IDPs. Many more families are ready to return now, if water and electricity are restored. The families present now need support in any form possible.

**Water:** A well was dug here by U.S. Coalition forces several years ago, but after the liberation of the area from IS in December 2014, the well pump and generator were stolen. **Trebka is therefore now in need of a new well pump and generator.**

**Electricity:** Power lines run from Snune to Trebka, but after the Dec. 2014 liberation, the transformers on the power lines were stolen. These also have to be replaced in order for electricity to be restored to the village.

**Rebuilding:** IS did not destroy any homes here, but after the liberation of the area, the wooden beams that hold up the roofs (in mud houses) were looted from 5 homes by soldiers needing wood to burn as fuel. These homes were inhabited before the IS attack and must be repaired so that the families can return.

**11 – Snune (collective village)**

Snune is the first collective village encountered when entering the Sinjar region from the north and is also the seat of the **nahiya**, the local administrative area (a subdistrict of the Sinjar qaimaqamiya). Grid power now exists in Snune and a number of stores and businesses are now functioning. IS destroyed 75 homes inside and around the town of Snune.
Population: (Pre-Aug. 3 population not available) A member of the local PDK committee reports that 51 families have returned to Snune and that 7 IDP families are living in Snune itself.

Medical services: A hospital exists in Snune that serves the larger area. Staff in the hospital report that the lab is functional (some IDP families had complained that this was not the case, and there may be some confusion on the issue) and that the hospital is receiving between 1,000 and 1,500 patient visits per week.

12 – Road to Hariqo
This is an area with some homes on the main road itself (the east side of the main road running from Snune to the mountain), at the turn going east to the village of Hariqo. IS blew up 6 houses here and burned 2 more. IDP families are now living inside the burned-out ones.

Current Population: 10 families total are living in this place now; 5 are IDPs and 5 are returnees. We were told (mid-Dec.) that 4 more families will be returning soon.

Needs: There is no electricity here. Families complain of a lack of kerosene. Families also complain that NGOs bringing aid to the mountain never stop to help them.

13 – Hariqo
Hariqo is a village that was devastated by IS. 40 families lived here prior to IS; only 2 families have returned, in addition to 2 IDP families that are living there. IS blew up 7 homes and burned 29 homes here. IS destroyed this entire village—only 4 houses survived the destruction. Repairs will not be sufficient to remedy the damage; it will be necessary to completely rebuild most of the homes. There is a school here that is not open now.

14 – Belef
Befel is an area running up and down the west side of the road to the mountain. IS destroyed 4 houses in Belef (perhaps more). 40 families are now living in Belef, 38 of which are IDPs and 2 of which are returnees. The families complain that they do not receive any aid from the NGOs delivering aid to the mountain.

Education: These families have no access to a school and some of the children have been out of school for 2 years now. Reopening schools in Snune could solve this problem.
**Water:** Before IS, every house in Belef had its own well, but IS destroyed the pumps so the village is now being supported by just 2 wells, one at the north end of Belef and the other at the southern end.

**15 – Gersherin**  
This place contains 4 houses that currently house 6 families, 5 of which are returnees and 1 of which is an IDP family.

**16 – Hassouna Village**  
This is a small village located at the base of the mountain on the east side of the road, just before reaching the gateway to the mountain. IS took control of this village but did not hold it long enough to destroy homes.

**Current Population:** In December, 43 families are living in Hassouna, 19 of which are IDPs and 24 of which are returnees. The IDP families are worried that as more families return to their homes, they will have to vacate the houses they have taken shelter in and do not know from where they will acquire tents. The locals complain that since this village is not considered part of Snune nor Kerse (the first town to the south, inside the mountain), it is often neglected in terms of needs.

**Electricity:** Grid power is here now, but it is too weak and comes too infrequently to power their well pumps, so they rely on generators.

**Mill:** A mill has been donated to the village to allow people to grind grain locally, but they need a powerful generator to operate it.

**17 – Dare Kerse**  
This is an area at the base of the mountain on the northwest side of the road, just before it enters the mountain, containing scattered homes. Currently, 22 families are living here: 20 IDP families and 2 local families that have returned. Most of the families are keeping animals here and living off of them. This area does not receive attention and the IDP families are neglected.

**Notes and Recommendations for Zone 2:**  
- A school needs to be reopened in Snune as soon as possible to serve the needs of the IDP families living along the road between Snune and the mountain. Families are complaining that because of the lack of educational services, they may have to relocate to IDP areas on top of the mountain (where the Barzani Foundation and the PKK have a number of schools) in order to provide education for their children. This would mean further burdening that area, however, as well as moving families away from the services available in Snune and into much colder locations.
- The local PDK committee reported that all areas along the road south of Snune to the mountain contain a total of 85 families, 30 of which are IDP families. (This does not include Trebka or Snune.) These numbers are lower than those gathered by Yazda in this assessment which may be because they are older. The total number between Snune and the mountain determined by Yazda amounts to 125 families. This will also likely continue to increase in the near future.
**Zone 3**

**18 – Dugure (collective village)**

Dugure is the first collective village east of Sinjar. Its pre-Aug. 3 population was 26,000 people. It is one of the most devastated towns of the Sinjar area as IS destroyed (burned or demolished) 450 homes; the total is **536** homes including those that experienced partial damage. So far **15** families have returned. No IDPs live here that we know of. The widespread destruction will impede the resumption of normal life, through much of the town does remain habitable and many could start their lives again here if services and rebuilding are given attention. Limited grid power is now active here. For Dugure’s water issues, see entry #**31 – Adiqa**.

An affluent home destroyed in Dugure. The systematic, widespread destruction of Yazidi homes was part of the genocidal strategy to destroy the wealth that it had taken the Yazidi community generations to accumulate and to prevent them from returning home.

Yazidi homes demolished by IS in Dugure
19 – Kherava
An area between Dugure and the main road. 3 IDP families are living here.

20 – Dohola (collective village)
The pre-IS population of Dohola was 12,000 people. This was the only collective village north of Sinjar with a sizable Muslim population; perhaps as much as 40% of Dohola was Muslim. IS destroyed 150 homes here. 40 families have returned (Dec.). Grid power has not returned.

Water: Dohola has a serious water problem that precedes Aug. 3. Wells cannot be dug in the town because the water is not potable. The town survived in the past by having water trucked in from other nearby towns. A project to dig 8 wells in Sheikh Quraysh (Zone 4, foot of the mountain south of Dohola) to provide water for Dohola was initiated, but the project was mismanaged and Dohola received no water from it. After the December liberation of the north side of the mountain, a foreign NGO began paying to have water trucked in to the town for those residents who were returning. They paid for 2
tanker trucks to deliver water regularly, but the 5-month contract that the NGO had committed to had just run out at the time of our assessment. Local residents are uncertain as to whether a government (Baghdad or the KRG) will take responsibility to begin bringing in the water. As of the date of this assessment, the water situation remains critical here.

21 – Gregawre
Gregawre is an area of outspread farmlands north of the main road just west of the road to Borek. Before IS came it was inhabited by 54 families. 35 of these families have returned and reportedly no IDP families are living here. IS demolished (bulldozed or blew up) 3 homes here and burned 1 home.

Needs: Temporary shelter is needed for the families whose homes were destroyed. Funds are also needed for rebuilding. Gregawre had a school but it is not functioning now; it should be reopened as soon as possible. The area has never had potable drinking water; in the past it was always trucked in. This is now an urgent issue.

Note: Our assessment did not account for destroyed homes in an area north of the road between Gregawre and Dohola.

22 – Beetuni
Beetuni was an area of outspread homesteads east and adjacent to the road running north to Borek. Prior to Aug. 3 it had 140-150 families. Around 50 families have returned (no IDPs that we know of). IS blew up 4 houses, burned 10 houses, and burned the school in Beetuni.

Adapting in order to return: Many people in this area were not farmers but were laborers of other sorts; however, they are now becoming farmers out of necessity after returning. The kind of economy that used to support them previously no longer exists and they are turning to subsistence modes of living in order to survive. This area will need support similar to that of the farming areas assessed in Zones 1 & 4. Since the people in Beetuni are new farmers, they may need special forms of help.

Education: A school needs to be built/rebuilt for Beetuni. This is urgent.

23 – Borek (collective village)
Borek’s pre-IS population was 23,000 people. So far, 100-120 families have returned, all originally from Borek. IS demolished/burned 256 homes.
Education: A KRG school has been reopened here. It is the only collective village that we are aware of where a school is functioning. (The reason that a school is functioning in Borek while the other collective villages remain without them is that more families have returned to Borek than to any other collective village. There are two reasons for the higher level of returnees to Borek: 1) a higher percentage of people from Borek took refuge on the mountain rather than fleeing to Dohuk; 2) there are 4 Peshmerga battalions stationed in Borek.) At this point, a second school needs to be reopened in Borek, as the need now exceeds what a single school can contribute.

Water: Like Dohola, since 1975 (when the collectives were created by Saddam) Borek relied on water being trucked in. A pre-Aug. 3 project to pipe water from wells in Hajali was mismanaged and produced no water for Borek. The same recent situation as Dohola also applies here, in that the 5-month NGO contract to pay to have water trucked in has expired. This is a crucial issue since the number of returnees is increasing, and services should not be decreasing.

Health Care: The health center in Borek is not functioning. It should be reopened immediately. Most of the health center’s staff were from Borek itself, so it will be a straightforward matter to get it operational again.

Other needs: No grid power has been restored here.

24 – Gohbal (collective village)
Before IS, Gohbal had a population of 13,700. 40 families have returned, all originally from Gohbal (this number comes from a member of the PDK local committee and includes those families that have returned to the village of Shorka on the road to Gohbal). Gohbal experienced tremendous destruction: the total number of houses destroyed (demolished and burned) and partially damaged (also including the village of Shorka) is 781.

Water: Gohbal’s water situation is complex. Whereas Dohola and Borek do not have potable water, Gohbal is where the transition to better water in the east begins. One half of Gohbal has bitter wells, the other half of the town has sweet wells. In the past, the U.S. Coalition forces funded a project to dig better wells and solve Gohbal’s water problem, but it was badly managed and Gohbal did not see a single drop of water. The wells in Gohbal remain functional today, but do not provide potable water, and the situation remains problematic, as it was prior to Aug. 3.

Other needs: The three main factors preventing people from returning to Gohbal are: 1) that no school has been reopened; 2) the lack of electricity; 3) that no health center has been reopened.

25 – Shorka
This is a village on the road to Gohbal, between the main road and the collective. We did not include Shorka in this assessment, but the number of returnees included in Gohbal (above) allegedly includes those in Shorka. We will confirm this number and include Shorka in our next version of this report.
26 – Zorava (collective village)
Before IS, Zorava’s population was 1,420 families, or 8,500 people. About 20 families have returned now. Zorava is one of the more heavily devastated villages: IS demolished/burned around 450 houses here.

**Electricity:** No grid power has been restored. This is because the Zorava substation has not been repaired. The Zorava substation routes power to Borek, Gohbal, Zorava, and Hardan. Fixing it should be a priority. Families are using generators to power their wells.

**Education:** No school has been reopened here and the people of Zorava are asking for one to be reopened.

27 – Hardan and 28 – Gershabak
Of all locations included in this report, Hardan is the closest one to the front line. Because of this, no families have returned yet to Hardan, or to Gershabak, a village on the road to Hardan. Both towns were of mixed Yazidi/Muslim populations. Some farmers have begun visiting their lands in the area.

**Notes and Recommendations for Zone 3:**
- The collective villages in this area have smaller IDP populations than the communities at the foot of the mountain (in zones 1, 2, and 4) because their distance from the mountain makes them more vulnerable and less defensible. Most IDPs who did not flee to the Kurdistan Region remained on or very near the mountain itself.
- The collective villages have their own set of issues and needs which go beyond the scope of this assessment. In some sense the treatment of the collective villages by this survey is simpler while the rural communities are examined with greater complexity. Whereas it is possible for Yazda to survey the needs of small villages and farming communities, it is more challenging to identify and assess the needs of small urban towns like the collective villages, each of which has more complex infrastructural concerns.
- People are angry because electricity now exists in Snune, Dugure, and Sharfeddin, but not in the Borek vicinity or east of it. People are asking why Rabi’a and Arab villages have electricity but not in many of the Yazidi towns. People reported having complained to the nahiya but seeing no change. The main issue is that the Zorava substation sends power to Borek, Gohbal, Zorava, and Hardan, but it is broken and has not been repaired or replaced. Fixing it should be a priority as 4 collective villages will depend on power from it.
- The health center in Borek should be reopened immediately. Most of the health center’s staff were from Borek itself, so it would be a straightforward matter to get it operational again.
- Schools need to be reopened in every area included in Zone 3, urgently. This will facilitate returns.
- Members of the local PDK committees told us that they want to have special berms created around each collective village, to make them more defensible in cases of any future attacks by jihadists. The berms would also inhibit the entry of attacking forces into the villages. The decision regarding this request is up to the mudir al-nahiya.
Zone 4

29 – Faiadh
Faiadh is an area of farming directly south of Dugure, on the south side of the main road. Before IS came, the area had 10 families. Of these, 5 families have returned. IS destroyed 7 houses and 2 wells here. The people in this area grow barley and raise sheep.

A family from Faiadh whose house, car, and well were all destroyed by IS, now building a new house. They lost everything but are not giving up. Rather than leave Iraq, they have returned to Sinjar and are starting their lives over.

30 – Queisi
This is a tiny area east of Faiadh and Kherava. It only has a few houses. No one has returned, the only population now is a YBŞ base at the side of the road.

31 – Adiqa (31a – Adiqa farm region; 31b – Adiqa village)
Adiqa is a large area that consists of an old village (also “Adiqa”) near the mountain, and an extended area of outspread farmland north of the village and south of Faiadh and Queisi.

Current population: There are now 120 families living in the Adiqa area; 21 of these are in the village itself. Of the 120 families, 16 are IDPs. If electricity and water are improved, 100 families could move
back to the village itself. IS blew up 10 houses in Adiqa, burned at least 6, and blew up the school. Adiqa lost fewer homes relative to other areas because the PKK positioned a large “doshka” machine gun plus 2 snipers in the village and these were able to defend the area from demolitions and prevent IS from ever entering the village. IS was able to blow up the school because it was located far to the north of the village, away from the defensible area.

**Farming and rebuilding livelihoods:**

There is tremendous opportunity in Adiqa to help people rebuild their lives and better support the IDPs that they are trying to sustain.

Primary crops grown in Adiqa: wheat, barely, onions, tomatoes, cucumbers, eggplant, radishes, parsley, garlic, fava beans, okra, watermelon.

- Primary needs to restart farms are fuel, seeds, and fertilizer
- Extensive looting has meant the loss of much of the farm equipment
- Seeds: Winter is not the time to begin planting wheat and barley, but the other crops are outlined below, with costs of seeds quoted from local farmers:
  - **Okra:** planted in the spring – box of seeds costs 25,000 IQD; each farm needs an average of 4 boxes
  - **Tomatoes:** planted in the winter and spring – box of seeds costs 33,000; each farm needs 4 or 5 boxes
  - **Cucumbers:** 3 plantings per year – 2 kinds, a large kind (“ghazir”) and a small kind (“amir”); the ghazir cost 35,000 per box of seeds and the amir cost 25,000 per box. Of each kind, each farm needs 3 or 4 boxes (times 3 for the 3 yearly plantings)
  - **Watermelon:** planted in March – 35,000 IQD per box of seeds; each farm needs one or two boxes
Onions: 55,000 to 60,000 IQD per box and each farm needs an average of 8 boxes  

Eggplant: planted in winter – farmers reported already having what they need for eggplant  

Radishes: planted in August – 1 kilo of seeds costs 10,000 IQD; each farm needs 2 or 3 kilos  

Parsley: planted late summer – 2 kinds exist: “sweet” and “bitter”; 1 kilo of seeds of the “sweet” cost 12,000 IQD; 1 kilo of seed of the “bitter” cost 10,000 IQD; each farm needs 2 or 3 kilos of each kind  

Garlic: bulbs cost around 2,000 IQD per kilo; the average farm needs around 20 kilos to plant  

Fava beans: planted in February – each farm needs 50 kilos of beans to plant; there are two quality types, normal ones that cost 2,500 IQD per kilo and high quality “French” ones that cost 7,000 per kilo  

Green peppers: planted in spring – 60,000 IQD per bag of seeds; each family needs just one bag. There are two kinds, “long” peppers and “round” (bell) peppers, they are the same price  

Zucchini: planted in spring – 7,000 to 8,000 IQD per bag of seeds; each farm needs 5 bags  

Figs: A young fig sapling costs around 15,000 IQD; they will start bearing fruit after 4 years  

- No single farm can plant all of the above; it will be best to work directly with farmers and allow them to select several crops that they want to plant. The most important crops for these farmers are cucumbers and tomatoes.  

- Fertilizer: two kinds are needed, as mentioned by those in other locations; each farm needs 1 ton of both kinds per year. The two kinds are the murakab blend (same price referenced as the price mentioned by farmers in Qaserke) and the “shekri” which costs 800,000 IQD per ton.  

Fuel: The people of the area reported that only a handful of families have received fuel from the Nahiya, and that it was only 100 liters per family, that they were each charged 18,000 IQD for it, that they had to transport it themselves, and that it required burdensome procedures and the copying of many documents. They are also disappointed that they have not received support in the form of diesel for their tractors and generators.  

Education: 
Because IS blew up the school, the community is now holding classes in an unfinished building that has no windows or doors, no electricity, and no running water. The structure is made of
blocks that have not been covered over with cement, which means the wind can enter the building making it very cold. The school receives kerosene from the KRG Dept. of Education. There are currently 173 pupils ages 6 to 15. They have 7 teachers who each work 2 shifts. They have sufficient school supplies, which were provided to them by UNICEF, but the families cannot afford the school uniforms for their children. They need help to finish the building, but a better option, which they would prefer, is to switch to using tents for the school and move the site a more centrally-located place in Adiqa. Currently, the new makeshift school is located far from the majority of the families. They need a donor for these tents, which need to be large enough to accommodate classrooms.

**Electricity:** The restored grid power that now exists in Snune and Dugure is also reaching the farmlands of Adiqa, but it is too weak to operate their well pumps for irrigation. Further, the village of Adiqa has never had electricity and is still waiting to be connected to the power grid. No power lines have been run there.

*A family that fled their home to the mountain on Aug. 3, fought against IS until winter, and returned to their land Dec. 2014 when the north side of the mountain was liberated. IS blew up their home and car, but they have built a single room out of cinder blocks that they live in now while restarting their farm.*

*The village of Adiqa, near the mountain (31b on the map)*
Water: Adiqa has a serious and dangerous water issue: the wells in the farming area produce only bitter water, but the people are drinking from them anyway because they do not have an alternative water source. Before Aug. 3, the Nineveh government dug 5 wells inside the village (which is located at the base of the mountain). This project was actually not intended to benefit Adiqa; the wells were to supply water to Dugure, which likewise can’t produce its own drinking water. Though the village of Adiqa itself, which is at the mountain’s base, can produce clean drinking water, the majority of the area of Adiqa, which is the outspread farmlands, has the same problem as Dugure. The people in Adiqa, therefore, want a pipeline from the new wells to also supply Adiqa as the water is pumped northward to Dugure. The new wells have never been operational. Since Adiqa has never had electricity, it remains unclear how these wells are intended to operate. (The people living inside the village are drinking clean water from a pre-existent well there, but this well cannot supply sufficient drinking water for the people in the farmlands.

Other infrastructural issues: There is a gravel road to the farms, but only a dirt road to the village, and this gets very muddy in the winter, which creates access problems.

Health care: This community is not satisfied with the health services available in Snune and wishes that a health center located closer by (perhaps in Dugure) would be opened.

Notes: Yazda did mobile medical work and one aid distribution in this area in the summer. People here have reported that they receive almost no aid or support. They also made a point of requesting equal support for all 120 families in the area.

32 – Sharfeddin, road to Sharfeddin, and Qne
Sharfeddin is a village containing the Shareddin Temple. It is also a base for Peshmerga forces under the command of Qasim Shesho, a Yazidi tribal leader who agreed to align with the PDK Peshmerga in late 2014 in exchange for weapons support. Sharfeddin is also the headquarters for Haider Shesho, Qasim’s nephew, who heads the non-aligned HPE (formerly HPŞ) militia described in section 2 of this report. Included in this entry are those who live on the western side of the road coming to Sharfeddin from the main road, and the tiny village of Qne (depopulated by Saddam) that sits on the east side of the road to Sharfeddin.

Current population: The current estimate is 150 families around 10% of which are IDPs (it is an estimate because the person who was keeping the list left after the list had reached around 120 families). IS did not control the village of Sharfeddin, but they did control the inhabited area of the road leading up to it, and the zone was a fierce frontline that resulted in destruction of property. Destruction of homes affected those from the area, so their situation resembles that of the IDPs. The number of returnees is increasing rapidly. Electricity from Snune is active, but weak.

Education: A school operates here now, containing more than 200 pupils. The school has no kerosene heaters.

Health care: They have a primary health center here but it has no doctor and they would like improved medical services.
Other needs: Food, kerosene, tents for those living in unfinished buildings (including not only IDPs but those from the area whose homes were destroyed).

33 – Hajali (temple) and Rashid (small village on the road to Hajali)
These two locations (close in proximity) house 23 families, 2 families of which are IDPs. The area was not taken by IS. 7 wells exist here that were supposed to supply Borek with water, but because of mismanagement the project was not successful. Only one well is functional.

34 – Al-Dina Village, site of the Ezi Temple
This place has 10 families originally from Al-Dina. IS never took this area.

35 – Teref
Teref is a village west of Ezi Temple that was not taken by IS. None of the families left and the population is the same as pre-Aug. 3. There are 49 local families here and no IDP families.

36 – Sheikh Quraysh
This area is named after the Yazidi shrine of Sheikh Quraysh that exists in the place. The area is spread out along the foothills of the mountain and contains 8 houses. (This is shown by a green oval on the map. The houses are distributed along the east-west running road.) The area was never taken by IS. It houses 13 families from Sheikh Quraysh and 1 IDP family. The IDP family mentioned needing an extra tent.
8 wells are located here that were dug in order to provide water to Dohola, but the grid power (which does exist in Sheikh Quraysh now) is too weak to power these wells. Further, the status of the wells is unknown; they were never finished and have never provided water to Dohola.

37 – Zabogiya
This tiny area is at the base of the mountain. It only has 2 families, who keep sheep in the area. (These families are “semi-IDPs;” see entry #40 – Bakira.) They need food, kerosene, and tarps to help winterize the leaky roofs of their houses. The area can be accessed by the road that comes from Sharfeddin and then to Sheikh Quraysh.

38 – Useva Village
Useva is the largest community in the Sharfeddin area, with 108-110 families. Around 20 of these are IDP families. Useva was never taken by IS and it continues to be inhabited by its original residents. Resources are very limited here, however.

Water: Water is a problem, as there has been no well. Until now, water has to be trucked in; however, the PKK is now digging a well. The completion date of this well is unknown.

Other needs: Useva only has a dirt road. There is no doctor in Useva so health services remain an important need.

39 – Naqse Sherfeddin
Naqse Sherfeddin was a village destroyed by Saddam that is now being rebuilt and re-inhabited by IDPs. It contains 40 families, all of which are IDPs who fled here on Aug. 3. The fact that a concentration of IDPs are living in this hidden place remains unknown to NGOs and the people need assistance. There is a road from Useva to Naqse but it is very dangerous (narrow with steep drop-offs), therefore we recommend using a better road that comes from the main road, passing through Bakira (still a dirt road).
Naqse is home to two Yazidi temples, Sheikh Barakat and Sheikh Shams (a second Sheikh Shams temple, not to be confused with the one in Jifriya). One form of livelihood practiced here is beekeeping.

**Electricity:** A weak electrical cable runs from Sharfeddin to the village; they need a better power line.

**Other needs:** The families need 40 tents (one for each family) because the structures they live in now are not effective at keeping out cold or for providing enough space for the families. The road is very bad and needs to be improved. No school exists here. The closest health services available are in Sherfeddin, which is a difficult drive in the dark or bad conditions. Families need food, kerosene, and any non-food items that are available; they have nothing.

**40 – Bakira**

IS came close to this location but was unable to conquer it. It contains 53 “semi-IDP” families (families from Zorava who own the land here and are therefore technically living in their own property, but who are still IDPs in the sense that they had to flee their homes for safety and lack resources) and 14 IDP families. The people depend on sheep and beehives in this area. The area is not a single concentrated group of settlements, like a village, but an area with outspread homesteads and several clusters of IDP settlements.

**Beehives:** A beehive with bees costs 160,000 IQD. They can be purchased in Dohuk.

**Electricity and water:** Electricity has never existed here. They have dug some wells here, but the lack of power is a problem.

**Education:** There is no school here.

**Other needs:** They lack kerosene. The Nahiya charged them 18,000 for 100 liters of kerosene but the quality of kerosene provided by the Nahiya was so bad that it destroyed some heaters. This is one of the primary needs here.

**41 – Kormala**

This is an area inside some foothills at the base of the mountain. There was an ancient Yazidi village here that was depopulated and destroyed by Saddam, but Yazidis had re-inhabited it prior to Aug. 3. The people here resisted when IS invaded. Above the village are caves that Yazidi families used in decades past to escape Ba’athist conscription; the families took refuge in them when IS attacked, and a mere 4 men positioned on higher ground were able to prevent IS from taking the homes. IS snipers did, however, shoot 30 goats that belonged to the people of Kormala, as well as destroy their water tanks.

**Current population:** Before IS, Kormala was home to 15 or 16 families; the population now is 6 families. None are IDPs.

**Livelihoods:** People here keep sheep/goats (when they have them) and grow wheat, barley, figs, olives, and grapes.
Needs: There has never been electricity here. There is a significant need for kerosene.

A farmer in Kormala, December 2015

42 – Zerwa
Zerwa is a village home to 20 families originally from the village. None of the local families left and there are no IDPs. IS took the village of Zerwa and the people fled up into the mountain to the temple of Piri Awra just southwest of this location, but IS did not remain long and did not destroy anything. The conditions here are very grim. They have never been visited by an NGO but the PKK brought them flour. The flour delivery is not ongoing and needs remain severe. The people here live off sheep and do some farming. They are very poor in this location.
Electricity and water: There are power lines here but no grid power. They dug two wells here but they didn’t produce any water. They have to bring their water from the well that the PKK dug in Piri Awra.

Education: There is no school here and the local children have missed two years of school. These families used to send their kids to school in Zorava prior to Aug. 3.

Other needs: There are no health services or medicine here. Fuel is a significant need: Many bataqa-holders were not given any kerosene. Others received 100 liters but were charged 18,000 IQD by the Nahiya.

43 – Piri Awra
Piri Awra is the name of the Yazidi temple located in this place, up inside the mountain. 9 families live here, all of whom are relatives who care for the temple. There are no IDPs here now. They remained in this place since Aug. 3 and never left. They are not visited by NGOs, but the PKK dug a well here (in Aug. 2015) and they received a donated mill.

Electricity and water: There has never been government-provided electricity here. The local people themselves ran a single line from Zerwa, but after Aug. 3 there has been no power. They now use a large generator donated by the Yazidi awqaaf in Baghdad. The well is functional and a pump donated by the PKK is so far providing sufficient water for the area. The PKK also brings them fuel for their generator. A flour mill was given to them but they need an electrician or mechanic to come and help them test it and see if the generator is capable of powering it.

Other needs: Kerosene, food, and medicine. Health care and medicine are important needs here because Piri Awra is so remotely located. The road (dirt road) washes out frequently and must be improved.

Garbage: There is no way to dispose of garbage here and people were dumping plastic trash near a spring located just above the settled area. Yazda personnel discussed with the local families the importance of disposing of trash in a better location away from the spring, but a more satisfactory solution needs to be found.
44 – Bakhalif

IS took this place but did not destroy any houses. They did destroy well pumps and electrical transformers. Currently, 7 families have returned and 3 more are planning to return soon. The people keep sheep and grow wheat and barley.

**Electricity:** A line runs to part of the village, but there’s no grid power. The electrical transformers that IS destroyed will have to be replaced.

**Water:** The local families have repaired the well pump destroyed by IS and are running the well. However, the village needs a second well.

45 – Gormiz

This is the easternmost Yazidi village of the Sinjar region. It is located on the south side of the main road, just east of the turnoff that goes north to Gershakab and Hardan. Prior to IS, it was home to 20 families; currently 6 families of the original population have returned. There are also 8 IDP families living here, who are of the same tribe as the village. They have not received help from any NGOs, governments, or parties.

**Rebuilding:** IS took this town and destroyed 12 cement houses and burned at least 10 mud houses. The following categories (water, electricity, education) are also related to rebuilding because IS targeted infrastructure related to all three.

**Water:** IS also destroyed the pump and generator for the sole well that used to supply the village; they also destroyed the water storage tank by shooting it.
Electricity: There is no electricity here; in some places the power lines were cut by IS.

Education: A school existed that is closed now. IS destroyed the furniture and contents of the school, but not the building itself.

Demining: Because this village was the frontline after Dec. 2014, there are still mines in the area (on the nearby hills) and some booby traps inside some of the houses. They need some help with the demining. NGOs should not feel afraid to enter the village on the main road to provide aid and support to the families as the road is cleared and the families and coming and going.

Zone 5
As mentioned in the introduction, the area on top of the mountain is not included in this assessment. We recommend consulting with Tom Robinson of the Rise Foundation regarding their assessment of areas of IDP settlement on top of the mountain (entitled “Sinjar Mountain Needs Overview”). It should be noted, however, that 1) the numbers of IDP families have grown significantly since Rise conducted their survey; 2) non-IDP communities that existed prior to Aug. 3 were not included in Rise’s survey, such as the town of Karse. These areas will eventually be included in a future version of this report.

A 96-year-old Yazidi man and his wife living as IDPs in a tent on top of Sinjar Mountain
Totals for Zones 1–4 (the North Side of Sinjar Mountain) — Dec. 20, 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zone</th>
<th>Destruction</th>
<th>Returnees</th>
<th>IDPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zone 1</td>
<td>Over 107 homes destroyed¹</td>
<td>97 families</td>
<td>36 families²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zone 2</td>
<td>128 homes destroyed³</td>
<td>94 families</td>
<td>95 families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zone 3</td>
<td>2,191 homes destroyed;¹ 1 school destroyed</td>
<td>320 families</td>
<td>3 families⁵</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zone 4</td>
<td>45 homes destroyed; 1 school destroyed⁶</td>
<td>475 families</td>
<td>171 families⁷</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total, Zones 1 – 4:</td>
<td>2,471 houses and 2 schools destroyed</td>
<td>986 families</td>
<td>305 families</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Important notes on the generation of the above figures:

1) Yazda visited every location included in this report, but derived the figures in several ways. In smaller communities and areas of rural farmland, Yazda did one of the following: 1) counted the number of families themselves; 2) performed the count together with local families; or 3) spoke to a local individual responsible for keeping the lists of families by *bataqa* (both returnees and IDPs). For the collective villages, Yazda sometimes performed the tasks just mentioned, but in other cases relied on numbers provided by local authorities. These numbers are changing rapidly in a number of locations as families continue to return. Therefore, the numbers for certain locations are very accurate whereas others may be low.

2) In terms of destruction, Yazda relied on counts provided by local individuals and government offices. In the rural areas, it is fairly straightforward to provide an accurate assessment of destruction. However, in the collective villages this is more complex. Some figures provided to Yazda included numbers of burned and demolished homes; others only knew the numbers of the demolished homes, and therefore a count of the number of burned homes is absent. In a few areas, people only had estimates and had

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¹ Demolished through explosives/bulldozing, or burned. The actual number is significantly higher—our number does not include burned houses in some locations, and also lacks figures on destruction in Khanasor.

² Does not include numbers of IDPs living inside Khanasor.

³ This number is likely low for a number of locations.

⁴ Does not include Hardan and Gershhabak.

⁵ The number of IDPs is so low in Zone 3 because most IDPs preferred to take refuge in areas close to the foot of the mountain that were more defensible, rather than the collective villages which were more vulnerable. If the security situation continues to improve, there may be a trend of IDPs from camps in Dohuk who take up residence in the collective villages.

⁶ An assessment of destruction in Sharfeddin is not included here.

⁷ Includes the “semi-IDP” populations of Bakira and Zaboqiya.
not performed a count of destroyed homes. Further, no attempt has been made here to assess damage to commercial property.

3) This report does not contain a thorough assessment on other forms of infrastructural destruction. Other forms of destruction have been included in this report when Yazda was aware of them, such as destroyed wells, destroyed electrical transformers, destroyed water tanks, etc., but these are included only in their respective entries and are not listed in this section with the totals. There is much greater infrastructural damage than Yazda has been able to include in this report. Two destroyed schools are mentioned in the totals, but there may be more.

4) Finally, all totals in this report reflect those accounted for by Yazda, not necessarily the actual totals, which are likely higher for all categories.

Section 4: Key Issues and General Recommendations

The following points recap and summarize some of the key issues from this survey, with some additional notes.

The Political Standoff
The central and regional governments and all parties should congratulate each other for any work done to support the area. They should set aside their differences and coordinate together to help restore the Yazidi people to their homeland, otherwise this minority community will continue to emigrate and decline in Iraq. The Yazidis are leaving Iraq in increasingly high numbers, and the longer the return of security and services to Sinjar is delayed, the more despair the community experiences and the more people will abandon their country. Some Yazidis are afraid that if they return to Sinjar, their aid will be cut off due to the political competition, and therefore their residence in the camps is being prolonged.

Rebuilding
The systematic burning, exploding, and bulldozing of Yazidi homes is widespread, to an extent that exceeded Yazda’s awareness before this survey was conducted. The extent of the damage is far-reaching and occurred in most communities north of Sinjar Mountain. IS also destroyed other forms of infrastructure, including wells, well pumps, generators, electrical transformers, power lines, and schools.

The main factors that determine whether Yazidis can return home are the provision of services—namely electricity, water, and education—and the rebuilding of homes.

Now is a time of opportunity not only to restore the Yazidi community following the attempted genocide of IS, but to right the wrongs of the Saddam years. If a rebuilding effort is to be conducted, it can involve helping Yazidis rebuilding their traditional villages that Saddam destroyed, rather than merely returning to the collective villages. This is what most want. An example of a location where Yazidis are rebuilding their traditional villages is Shaariya in the Dohuk governorate. Shaariya is a collective village created by Saddam, to which the inhabitants of several Yazidi villages were relocated, after which the traditional villages were destroyed by Saddam’s forces. In recent years, the inhabitants of Shaariya have begun
rebuilding their villages. The same can occur in Sinjar and has already occurred by necessity in places where Yazidi fled the collectives on Aug. 3 to traditional villages that they have been trying to make livable since (for example, see entry #39 – Naqse Sherfeddin).

Fuel (kerosene)
Everywhere that Yazda conducted its survey, the need that was most commonly mentioned was for kerosene. In almost every location, several themes were heard repeatedly: 1) that the Nahiya was charging Yazidi IDPs an 18,000 IQD “transportation fee” for kerosene that was supposed to be provided to them for free; 2) that rather than it being distributed in areas of IDP residence, IDPs had to find ways to travel to Snune and transport this fuel back to their camps or areas of settlement on their own—this is very difficult for those without cars and who cannot afford the gas to transport the kerosene; 3) that the quality of the kerosene was bad—some described it as “red” in color; 4) that many families received only 50 to 100 liters of kerosene, whereas each family needs an average of 200 liters per month; 5) that many families were not given any kerosene, despite presenting their bataqa cards. Perhaps NGOs can help fill in the need gaps left by this dysfunctional kerosene distribution program.

Farming
A major element in helping restore the region to health and allowing Yazidis to return home—as well as a way to provide more sustainable and ongoing sources of support for IDPs in the Sinjar region—is to promote the restarting of local farms. Three entries in the assessment provide the most information on farm projects (that can be implemented everywhere where cultivatable soil exists): #2 – Bahrava; #6 – Qaserke; and #31 – Adiqa. Also, entry #40 – Bakira mentions beehives which seem to be kept by families in settlement primarily east of Sharfeddin. These may be able to be promoted in other areas, as well.

Services
NGOs can help start or re-start schools and primary health centers in a number of locations that need them. This will be integral in promoting the return of IDPs to the area. These are described by location throughout the survey. Electricity and water are more challenging, but some organizations are prepared to play a role in bringing/improving these services, as well.

Guidelines for Fairness in Humanitarian Aid Distributions and Development/Rebuilding
1) When aid is taken (or when development/rebuilding projects are conducted), it should be given to all families in a given location, whether they are IDPs or returnees. Often, the situation of the returnees is equally as impoverished as that of the IDPs. Unequal distributions will cause problems.
2) NGOs should exercise extreme sensitivity and awareness regarding the delicate political climate in the area. This means that NGOs should attempt to coordinate their distributions with other NGOs and directly with local communities. There is usually a person in each area or village who keeps a list of families and who can help an NGO distribute to every family in an area. Yazda can offer assistance in connecting NGOs to local individuals who can ensure that all families are covered in distributions, regardless of political affiliations. If NGOs work alongside local government officials in the Sinjar region, many communities will feel apprehensive and distrustful. Officials are seen as politicized and the work of an NGO will no longer be perceived as neutral if it is conducted in conjunction with government
representatives. Fears are high that aid will not be received by those who are not politically affiliated or by those with a “wrong” political alignment.

3) A way to ensure that aid distribution is done fairly and equally is to distribute according to bataqa cards. The previous item mentioned that someone usually keeps a list of families in a given community. Numbers of families in such lists are counted according to bataqa cards. The bataqa card is a food ration card that every family in Iraq has (not just IDPs). These cards were introduced by the Iraqi government especially in the period following 1991 when sanctions were applied against Iraq following the invasion of Kuwait. The Iraqi government would distribute food to families according to the number of persons listed on each bataqa. NGOs can consult with villagers in each location to determine how many persons are in the community, by bataqa, and to distribute aid accordingly. Yazda is ready to assist with this process, when guidance is needed.

Other Notes on Aid
1) The most essential basic food items that Sinjar populations depend on are the following: Non-perishable food items: flour, rice, cooking oil, lentils (protein is important for combatting malnutrition), beans, tea, powdered milk (used to make yoghurt), tomato paste, bourghul, tahiniya/rashi (juice made of ground sesame), dibis (date juice—mixed with sesame juice and eaten on bread). Perishable food items: onions, potatoes, chickpeas (garbanzo beans), garlic, dates, eggs.
2) There is an old religious prohibition in the Yazidi religion on the color blue. This is a local practice that is not observed by all Yazidi communities; however, it is still observed by a number of religious Yazidis in certain areas. Caution should therefore be exercised, and when possible, blue tarps should not be distributed to IDP camps, but alternative colors should be found.

Section 5: Contacts

Any organization or individual seeking additional information on the situation in Sinjar, or needing guidance regarding aid and development efforts in the area is welcome to contact the following Yazda personnel:

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Mahmood Hajo (Kurdish/Arabic language only) – head of Yazda’s Sinjar Outreach work – 0750.825.3107